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Over the twentieth century the territorial distribution of economic activity and productive
resources in the Soviet Union and Russia has changed dramatically. Both historical events
and Soviet policies – notably the devastation of western parts of the USSR and the evacuation
of people and enterprises during WWII, re-evacuation and reconstruction after the war,
Stalin’s industrialization and the build up of the industrial capacity east of the Urals, and
Gulag, kulak and ethnic deportations – were driving these spatial shifts.
Still, largely because of the lack of of detailed data, we do not know much about how
these historical events and policies changed the economic geography of the USSR and Russia.
Were their effects short-lived, or did they persist over a long time? Could they still be
economically relevant today? More generally, should we expect a return to a “normal” path
of development after any exogenous shock, such as a war or “forced” policy, or can some
of the shocks or policies be so drastic that they permanently affect the spatial development
path?
In this paper, I analyze the patterns of city growth in the Soviet Union and the Russian
Federation by constructing a unique dataset on the location of Gulag camps and the evacua-
tion of industrial enterprises during WWII, and then matching those camps and enterprises
to the nearest urban settlements. I therefore estimate the effect of WWII, evacuation, and
Gulag camps on population growth in Soviet cities over a long time horizon. To my knowl-
edge, this is the first paper that looks at both Gulag and wartime events in the context of
regional population growth in the USSR using city-level data.
Working with city-level data allows me to investigate the spatial patterns of development
on a much finer scale and over a much longer time horizon. While sub-regional and regional
administrative boundaries have changed a lot during the Soviet history, cities are clearly
defined administrative units. With a panel of city-level data for a long historical period, I
can investigate the heterogeneity in population growth both between and within regions.
I find that the presence of a Gulag labor camp nearby is a strong predictor of future
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population growth in Soviet cities. WWII events (fighting on the front, evacuation) also affect
local population growth, but their effects are relatively short-lived, diminishing with time
and disappearing after about 25 years. In contrast, the Gulag camps have a permanent effect
on city size. The cities where camps were located grew significantly faster and continued to
grow faster long after the Gulag system itself was abolished.
This paper adds to two strands of the literature, the first of which is the literature on
population geography and industrial location in the USSR and the Russian Federation. A
number of existing papers analyze regional investment patterns and population growth over
the different periods of Soviet history: Hooson (1968) describes patterns of city growth prior
to and after the October revolution; Harrison (1988) and (1990) discuss the reallocation of
the Soviet industry to the eastern regions of the USSR prior and during the WWII; the
ideological principles of Soviet location policy and their actual realization were considered in
Dienes (1972), Dyker (1983), Huzinec (1977), and Rodgers (1974), among others; Andrienko
& Guriev (2004) and Kumo (2006) studied interregional migration flows in Russia after
transition.
The existing literature on Soviet economic geography relies mainly on region-level data
analysis, except for the analysis of Soviet population dynamics by Gang & Stuart (1999)
and Iyer (2003). Gang & Stuart (1999) study the growth of cities in terms of migration
restrictions in the USSR during the period from the 1930s to the 1980s. They find little
or no effect of these restrictions on population growth. I confirm their results for the wider
sample of cities, with more recent data, and a different methodology. Iyer (2003) looks at
the rank-size distribution of Russian cities and finds an increasing concentration of urban
population after the transition to a market economy.
The second strand of literature I add to deals with the dynamics of population and
industry in a series of historical “natural experiments.” Since Krugman (1991), theoretical
models of New Economic Geography predict the possibility of multiple stable equilibria in a
spatial economy. Yet the stability of equilibria implies that once an agglomeration is formed
3
in one location, it is difficult to change the spatial allocation of productive resources, even if
an alternative location is equally (or even more) suitable for concentrated economic activity.
Only large shocks to the spatial structure of the economy have the potential to trigger a
switch between equilibria. By looking at the wartime and post-war data, researchers can
observe how population and industrial geography change after a significant exogenous shock,
and determine whether wartime destruction can indeed trigger the switch between spatial
equilibria.
Davis & Weinstein (2002) and (2008) investigate the long-term dynamics of popula-
tion and industry location after the shock of WWII destruction in Japan using city-level
data. Brakman, Garretsen & Schramm (2004) and Bosker, Brakman, Garretsen & Schramm
(2007) look at German cities after WWII. Miguel & Roland (2011) look at the regions of
Vietnam and their recovery after U.S. bombing. In this literature, one common finding is
that wartime destruction has little or no effect on regional patterns of population growth,
industrial geography, or regional development in the long run. Regional population levels
tend to recover within 15-25 years after a shock. While this is true for Japan and Vietnam,
West Germany exhibits only partial reversion toward the pre-war levels. The robustness of
this result may suggest that the multiplicity of equilibria is either a purely theoretical notion
that does not normally occur in reality, or that even drastic wartime shocks are not large
enough to motivate a switch between equilibria.1
So far, the division of Germany after WWII is the only historical event researchers have
studied in which an exogenous shock resulted in permanent changes to the spatial economy
landscape. Redding, Sturm & Wolf (2011) find evidence of a multiplicity of equilibria in
the location of Germany’s air travel industry. The switch of equilibrium was triggered by
the post-WWII division of Germany, but its reversal was not triggered by the reunification
of Germany in 1990. Redding & Sturm (2008) find persistent long-term negative effects of
Germany division for the West German cities near the newly established border with Eastern
1Interestingly enough, East Germany does not exhibit mean reversion, presumably due to the heavy
influence of socialist planning after WWII. See Brakman et al. (2004) for more details.
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Germany. It is not wartime destruction that affected the relative sizes of German cities in
the long run, but rather the changes in their market access (market potential).
The Soviet Union presents a unique case for studying the effects of war on the spatial
economy and radical regional policy. On one hand, like many other countries the USSR
suffered direct effects of WWII: destruction of its capital and infrastructure and loss of
lives. On the other hand, during the 1930s to 1950s while capital and infrastructure in the
USSR were destroyed in the western regions they were being built up in the other parts of
the country, mainly in the east. Relocating people and capital across the country, Stalin
used policy to create industrial centers from scratch in places where they would hardly have
emerged as the result of free migration of small economic agents (people, firms) in a market
economy. Similar to the division of Germany, this served as a shock to market potential, but
it was a different type of shock: agglomeration externalities were not exogenously destroyed
(as in case of cities on the border between West and East Germany), but rather were created.
My findings on the effects of the war confirm the earlier literature: the impact of wartime
destruction, however devastating it might have been, was temporary. On average, Soviet
cities affected by the war eventually recovered. In contrast the Gulag, like the division
of Germany, presents an example of permanent change in the spatial economy landscape.
Redding et al. (2011) point out that even if multiple equilibria in industrial location are
possible, in order to switch equilibria the shock to industrial location has to be not only
strong but also perceived by economic agents as permanent. Soviet location policy (as
proxied by Gulag) is a perfect example of such a significant change which was thought to be
permanent at the time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a historical account of
Soviet population and industrial geography. Section 3 describes the data. Sections 4 to 6
analyze the data and report the results. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The History of Gulag, Wartime Evacuation, and the
Spatial Evolution of the Soviet Economy
Gulag
Gulag (a collection of penitentiary institutions) has its roots in the Russian Civil war period
of 1917-1922. The first concentration camps, where prisoners’ labor was used for “community
service,” were established as early as 1919. In the beginning, the primary purpose of these
camps was punishment, not economic activity. That doctrine changed as the 1930s began.
Ivanova (2006) cites a joint memo from the People’s Commissariats of Justice and the Interior
and the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU ) to the Council of People’s Commissars
of the RSFSR dated April 1929 proposing “1. To use prisoners serving a term of 3 years
or more in colonization of our northern frontier territories and in developing the natural
resources there.”2 Thus Gulag became a tool of regional development in the early 1930s.
At the same time, the number of camps and the total prisoner population began to grow
rapidly, from 179 thousand prisoners in 1930 to almost 1.9 million in 1938.3 Gulag population
continued to grow steadily until Stalin’s death, with the peak number of prisoners, 2.5 million,
in 1952. From 1935 to 1952, the Gulag system was responsible for 6-10% of all construction
in the USSR.4
Figure 1 illustrates the geographical location of the Gulag camps. Although originally in
remote locations, camps eventually were organized in practically all areas of the country. In
fact, a Gulag map looks much like the map of population density.
The largest camps were established at the sites of major infrastructure projects that
required a lot of labor. Not all of these camps were in the remote areas; of the ten biggest
camps, six were west of the Ural mountains and three were in or near major cities. Table 1
gives some examples of the location and major activities of the largest camps.
2Author’s translation, source: Ivanova (2006), page 161.
3Data compiled from NKVD documents, cited in many sources, including Applebaum (2003).
4Source: Khlevnyuk (2004), page 25.
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Source: Smirnov (1998), map online at www.memo.ru.
Figure 1: Gulag camps in the USSR.
Max
capacity,
thousand Capacity Years of
Camp name Location people rank operation Primary activity
Svobodnyi, Amur oblast
Baikal- 110 km north-east of Construction of Baikal-
-Amur ITL∗ Blagoveshensk 201 1 1932-1938 Amur railroad
Severo- 330 km north
-Vostochnyi ITL of Magadan 190 2 1932-1949 Gold mining
Dmitrov, 50 km north Construction of Moscow-
Dmitrovsky ITL of Moscow 189 3 1932-1938 Volga canal
Dalne- Railroad construction,
-Vostochny ITL Khabarovsk 112 5 1929-1939 coal mining, gold mining
Belomoro- Medvezh’egorsk, 120 km Construction of
-Baltiisky ITL north of Petrozavodsk 108 6 1931-1941 ”Belomorkanal”
Construction of
Rybinsk, 83 km north- hydroel. power plant and
Volzhskii ITL -west of Yaroslavl 88 8 1935-1942 canal infrastructure
Bezymyanskii
ITL Samara 81 9 1941-1946 Industrial construction
Mariinsk, 130 km north- Logging,
Sibirskii ITL -east of Kemerovo 78 11 1929-1960 road construction
*”ITL” is a transliteration of a Russian acronim for ispravetelno-trudovoi lager’ (correctional labor camp).
Table 1: Some of the largest Gulag camps
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A stereotype of a Gulag camp is a remote location with a hostile climate and no infras-
tructure, but looking at the newly systematized data on camp locations paints a different
picture.5 A vast majority of the camps operated in or near cities or towns. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of camps in terms of distance to the nearest population center with the
status of city: 83% of all camps were located no more than 35 kilometers from a settlement
with city status now, and 66% of all camps were no more than 35 kilometers from a city of
at least 10,000 inhabitants in 1939 (Figure 3). Thus, we can effectively conclude that Gulag
was mainly an urban phenomenon.
Figure 2: Number of Gulag labor camps by the distance to the nearest population center.
Camps tended to be located near larger cities. If we compare the distributions of cities
with and without Gulag camps nearby, we can see (in Figure 4) that the histogram of city
sizes is heavier on the right tail for the group of cities with Gulag. Remote camps, and
camps near small settlements, on average were larger by capacity (number of prisoners), but
that correlation was not very strong (see Figure 5).
In general, as a tool of regional policy Gulag helped to shift productive resources from the
5The main source of Gulag data is Smirnov (1998), digitized for this paper.
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Figure 3: Number of Gulag labor camps by the distance to the nearest population center of
10 000 people or more in 1939.
Figure 4: Cities with Gulag camps nearby vs. all cities, 1939.
western parts of the USSR to the remote corners of the country, and from small settlements
and the countryside to larger cities and new cities. In the introduction to his volume (page
10), Khlevnyuk (2004) notes that although the primary purpose of Gulag was penitentiary,
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Figure 5: City size in 1939 and total max capacity of Gulag camps in 50 km radius.
its sheer amount of “cheap” prison labor allowed for the initiation of investment projects
that hardly would have been possible had the Soviet government have to recruit voluntary
labor there. Numerous documents underline the shortage-of-labor motivation in the creation
and expansion of Gulag camps.6 Thus, geographically, the presence of a Gulag camp near
a city or town points to a local deficit of voluntary labor in the 1930s to 1950s. This
deficit, of course, was artificially created by Soviet planning itself and existed because of
state-controlled wages. In fact, Gulag camp may be a good indicator that some investment
project was undertaken nearby, and that the location was favored by the Soviet government
for industrial development.
6For example, Khlevnyuk (2004) cites a telegram to Stalin from the Secretary of the Far Eastern Regional
Committee of VKP(b) on the construction of metallurgical plant in Komsomolsk-na-Amure: “...the work
for 1936 would require above 10 000 workers at the construction site, which could not be met by the local
labor force balance. An expensive recruitment of workers from other parts of the (Soviet) Union would be
required, and when they arrive – we’d need to start construction of housing and service facilities... That is
why we believe the best solution is to transfer the construction of the metallurgical plant to the Far Eastern
NKVD camps...” (page 115-116, author’s translation).
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WWII evacuation
The Soviet government7 evacuated production lines and people (with priority given to skilled
industrial workers and engineers) from the western territories in the first days after the
German invasion. Thus, the first years of WWII resulted in a significant shift in regional
industrial structure, from both the destruction and from this evacuation. A number of cities
in the Soviet East received a significant positive shock to productive capacity, population,
and human capital. Evacuation was also a major shock to regional population shares.
To my knowledge, the geography of wartime evacuation has never been studied in detail
because the data were not available to the public. In public discourse, evacuation was long
viewed as one factor that fueled the development of the eastern regions.But in reality there
was no statistical evidence one way or the other that the cities that received evacuated
enterprises indeed grew faster, simply because the detailed data did not exist in the public
domain. In addition to the unavailability of the data, there is another challenge in accounting
for the effect of evacuation: it has to be disentangled from the effects of the Soviet location
policy in general. Evacuation, and the sudden change in the Soviet economic geography that
it brought, were not spatially random.
Harrison (1990) emphasizes Stalin’s conviction that his pre-war policies contributed
greatly to the USSR’s victory. Lieberman (1983) also notes that from the beginning of
1930s, one of the goals of Stalin’s industrialization clearly was to build up industrial ca-
pacity deep in the Soviet territory, in the Urals and eastward, where it would be safe from
invasion. These plans were only successful to a certain degree. The western parts of the
USSR were the traditional industrial core of the Russian Empire. It would be difficult to
shift the industrial base away from regions with a relative abundance of installed capital and
skilled labor. As Harrison (1990) argues, despite the efforts of the Soviet government, the
shift of industry eastward prior to the war was insufficient from the defense point of view.
7Central Committee of the Union Communist Party (bolshevik) and the Council of People’s Commissars
of the USSR, ”On the order of evacuation and relocation of the people and valuable resources”, June 27,
1941.
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Of course, the hurried evacuation in the first months of the war was a dire necessity, but it
was also a forced implementation of an existing plan.
One indirect piece of evidence for the “preexisting plan” argument is that many of the
evacuated plants either never moved back or continued to operate at both the new and old
sites after the war. Of the 1374 enterprises for which I have information, only 453 have a
record of being reestablished in some form at the old site after or during the war. Most
commonly in the case of restored enterprises, instead of one enterprise two were operating
after the war: one at the old and one at the new site.
Many of the cities to which enterprises were evacuated also hosted Gulag camps (the
correlation between indicators of evacuation and Gulag on territories far from the frontlines
is 41%; in the Urals, it is 46%). Naturally, if Gulag prisoners could easily be used to relieve
the local deficit of labor, than the enterprises should be evacuated to where labor was easier to
find in the war economy. This also suggests that the geographical allocation of the evacuated
enterprises correlated strongly with the pre-war allocation of investment.
The summary statistics are: 1) enterprises were evacuated from 116 different cities to
190 different cities; 2) the main evacuation destinations were large cities – out of the top-
20 destinations, 18 were oblast centers. However, many small settlements also received
enterprises. Table 2 presents several examples of the destination cities and their population
in the census years before and after the war. It was not uncommon for a city to increase its
population by several hundred percent between these two censuses.
I attempt to disentangle the effects of Gulag, wartime destruction, and evacuation in
order to determine how much of the change in population can be attributed to each of these
known factors. Section 3 describes the data sources in greater detail.
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population population number of rank by
1939, 1959, enterprises the # of
City thousand thousand received enterprises location
main destinations
Sverdlovsk 475 881 114 1
(now Ekaterinburg)
Novosibirsk 427 927 71 2
Kazan’ 418 647 66 3
Ufa 258 547 65 4
Kuibyshev 408 902 55 5
(now Samara)
smallest city-destinations
Pokhvistnevo 6.6 23 1 129-190 Kuibyshevskaia
oblast’
Tsivil’sk 5.1 5.9 1 129-190 Chuvashskaia
ASSR
Chebarkul’ 3.7 31 1 129-190 Cheliabinskaia
oblast’
Kataisk 2.8 12 1 129-190 Kurganskaia
oblast’
Ukhta 2.7 36 1 129-190 Komi ASSR
Table 2: Some examples of city-destinations in WWII evacuation.
3 Data
Population
The population data come from censuses in the Russian Empire (1897), the USSR (1926 -
1989), and the Russian Federation (2002, 2010). For census years 1959 and 1939, the data
come from Harris (1970); for all other years, from the original census publications. In all
of the years, the sample includes all population centers with a city status and some of the
larger rural settlements. 2002 and 2010 cross-sections include all urban population centers
(cities and urban-type settlements) and rural settlements of 15000 or more.
Overall, the unbalanced panel has 9 time points (census years). The sample grows from
534 cities (uezdnye goroda) in 1897 to 2,002 cities and sizable rural settlements in 2010.
Thirty-four small settlements with a city status are missing from the sample for 1926-1979
because they were omitted from the original publications.8
8Cities were omitted either because the population size dropped below the publication threshold for
a particular census year, or for secrecy reasons. Examples are “closed” towns (centers of defense-related
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The administrative boundaries of a city in the USSR were not fixed. As cities grew,
new land was added to the city territory, surrounding villages and small towns disappeared
(in an administrative sense), being incorporated into larger population centers. Thus with
the possible exception of the large agglomerations, the official city population data quite
accurately reflect the size of an integrated urban economic area. For Moscow, St. Peters-
burg, Ekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, and Nizhnii Novgorod, I calculate the population of the
agglomeration area, including all satellite cities and towns within a 30 km radius.
Gulag Camps
The main source of data for Gulag prisons and labor camps is a publication by the Russian
human rights organization “Memorial” (Smirnov (1998)), itself based on the archival sources.
It documents geographical location, presents estimates of the number of prisoners in different
years, and describes the main purpose of the camp or the economic activity that used the
prison labor. There were 475 camps on the territory of the Soviet Union; we know the
location of 460 of them is known; 408 were located inside the modern borders of the Russian
Federation.
I record the geographical coordinates for all of the camps with known locations. Then, I
use those coordinates to match population centers in the Russian Federation (cities, towns,
villages, settlements) to nearby Gulag camps. I record the distances from each city to the
nearest Gulag camp, and from each camp to the nearest city. In the 1939 sample 46% of
settlements with the status of city had a Gulag camp within 50 km or closer.
I categorize the camps according to a verbal description of their specialization. The four
main camp categories are: construction, industrial production, mining (resource extraction),
and agriculture and forestry (mainly logging operations). I split construction activities into:
construction of industrial establishments in the primary sector, other industrial construction,
construction of housing, and construction of infrastructure. Some of the highly specialized
research), or some towns in the area affected by the famine of 1933 that were deliberately excluded from
1939 census publications by the Soviet authorities.
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camps, the prisoner sorting centers (peresylnye centry), and the camps without a description
are not included in any of the groups.
WWII Losses
WWII dramatically affected the economic geography of the Soviet Union. The western parts
of the country were occupied by the Nazi Germany and suffered the greatest losses. Soviet
sources report the loss of 25% of the population in Belarus and up to 20% of the population
in Ukraine.9 It is likely that the occupied regions of the Russian Federation suffered similar
human losses. Unfortunately, detailed data on wartime losses by city or region in the USSR
does not yet (and possibly never will) exist in the public domain. It is not possible to infer
human losses from census data, because the first population census after the war was in 1959,
14 years after the war ended. Neither data on destruction of infrastructure and capital nor
information on restoration efforts by city or region ever were publicized. I can only construct
several simple indicators of the impact of WWII, based on the geographical location of the
city.
I construct three dummy variables on city location to single out population centers that
suffered from the war. First is an indicator that a city was occupied by the Germans at
some point during WWII. A second indicator includes all occupied cities and cities in close
proximity to the front lines (30 km). This way, we include cities that might never be formally
lost by the Soviet Army, but which could be severely damaged by bombings and artillery
fire. A third indicator includes all occupied cities and all cities within 200 km of the front
lines. This range should cover the majority of bombing targets.10
In my 1939 sample, 245 out of 772 cities (or 31%) were occupied by Nazi Germany, and
457 (or 59%) were at least 200 km from the front lines at some point during WWII.
9For example, “Belorusskaya SSR za 20 let (1944-1963)” (“Belorussia during 20 years”) Minsk, Statis-
tika, 1964 reports that total population of Belarus SSR in 1939 was 8.9 million; losses of Belarus population
during the war were more than 2.2 million people. The loss of civilian population only in Ukraine is reported
as 16% of total. Source: “Ukraina za 50 rokiv” (“Ukraine during50 years”), Central Statistical Unit with
the Government of Ukrainian USR, Kiev 1967.
10Source of maps: Andronikov (1975).
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WWII Evacuation
My source of data on evacuations is Dexter & Rodionov (2012), the database of the Soviet
military-industrial complex. Practically all functioning enterprises in the USSR produced
defense-related products in 1941-1946, and therefore are included in the database. According
to Kozlov (1985), 2,593 enterprizes (1,523 of them classified as “large”) were moved to the
eastern regions of the USSR, and of these 1,523 large establishments, 1,215 were sent to
the Urals, Volga region, and Siberia, i.e. to the territories that now belong to the Russian
Federation. Unfortunately, there is no information on the geography of small enterprise
evacuation. In the Dexter & Rodionov (2012) database, I found 1,374 establishments (either
large or small) that were relocated to 190 cities within the borders of modern Russian
Federation. Although the data are definitely incomplete, they account for a majority of the
evacuated enterprises.
For each city, I record the number of establishments evacuated from the city in 1941-1942,
the establishments evacuated to the city, and the establishments returned from evacuation in
1942-1948. Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate the size of the evacuated enterprises,
because the data on employment, capital, or production volume are not available. Thus,
only enterprise count variables and indicator variables for each city are constructed.
4 Data Exploration
In this section, I look at the general patterns in the data, describing in very general terms
how cities affected by Stalinist policies and the war differ from the control group of cities.
My first step is to match the cities to the Gulag camps. Figure 6 plots the change in a
city’s log-population against the distance to the nearest camp. There is a lot of heterogeneity
in city growth, but on average cities closer to Gulag grow faster. The effect gradually
diminishes and levels off at about 50 km. I choose a 50 km radius as the main threshold for
all further analysis. Cities with a camp within 50 km or less are considered the treatment
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group, the rest are the control group.11
Figure 6: City growth under Stalin and distance to Gulag: local polynomial smoothing.
Next, using this definition of Gulag cities, I compare the simple averages of city size.
Figure 7 illustrates the difference in average city size between cities that were affected by
WWII and Gulag relative to the control group. Clearly, the control group and treatment
groups were inherently different. Cities picked to house evacuated enterprises or Gulag
camps were larger than average in the 1920s. In the following decades, the gap between the
treatment and control groups widened even more.
It is clear from the graphs that there is a difference in the dynamics of population ge-
ography during Stalin’s time and after Stalin: the dynamics of city growth shows a clear
structural break in 1959 (which is the first census year after Stalin’s death). The pre-war
period (1926-1939) and 1939-1959 look very similar. Cities that received evacuation were
growing faster than average even before the war. The same is true for the cities that were not
occupied. This illustrates the general eastward bias of Soviet industrialization in the 1930s.
Emergency wartime measures and the shift in the Soviet economic geography in the 1940s-
1950s do not look like a sudden structural break, but rather continue the pre-war trend.
Whether this difference in the trajectories of city growth exists because of Soviet location
policy per se or because cities were inherently different is a question to be investigated.
In the rest of the paper I estimate the effect of Gulag, evacuation, and the war, con-
11I did robustness checks with 20 km threshold, the results are either the same or stronger.
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Graphs show: (1) ratio of the average size of a city that was not occupied in WWII relative to the average
size of a city that was occupied (left scale),
(2) ratio of the average size of a city that received evacuated enterprises vs a city that did not (for the cities
that were not occupied) (right scale),
(3) ratio of the average sizes of cities with and without a Gulag camp in less than 50 km (right scale).
Figure 7: Difference in city sizes by WWII occupation status, evacuation, and presence of
Gulag.
trolling for heterogeneity in city characteristics. First, I use individual effects the in panel
estimations; then, I use matching estimations.
5 Panel Estimations
In this section, I estimate a series of panel models on city growth data, using a difference-
in-difference methodology. I compare the average trajectory of city growth in the treatment
group (a subset of Russian cities that are affected by WWII, evacuation, or Gulag) with the
control group (other cities), controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by individual (random)
effects. The empirical specification is:
git = αt + β Treatment+
∑
s
γs(Treatment× Periods) + δi + ²it, (1)
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where git is an annualized growth rate of city’s population during a given time period;
Treatment is an indicator whether city i was affected by Gulag, WWII fighting or evacuation;
Periods is a time periods indicator; αt is a period-specific intercept, ²it - random error. δi -
random effects, included to control for all heterogeneity specific to the city, apart from the
Treatment. To trace changes in city growth patterns, I include the set of time-treatment
interaction terms for all periods (with 1897-1926 as an omitted benchmark).
The results are shown in Tables 3 - 5. Table 3 summarizes the results for WWII occupa-
tion and being close to the front lines. As expected, the time period that includes the war
years (1939-1959) admits a negative coefficient for treatment: cities that were affected by
the war grow more slowly. From 1959 to the 1980s, the affected cities recover, catching up
with the control group in terms of population. But the biggest decline in the growth rate
of the cities that would later be occupied by Nazi Germany, or be close to the front lines,
comes in the pre-war period of 1926-1939. It is not the war itself that is responsible for the
divergence between the growth trajectories of eastern and western cities. Rather, the shift
of population from the west to the east intensified in the late 1920s to 1930s, during the
pre-war industrialization period.
Table 4 shows estimation results for the wartime evacuation of industrial enterprises. For
cities that received evacuated enterprises (column (1)), the treatment variable has a positive
and significant coefficient. But the time period that includes the war years (1939-1959), or
the post-war period, is not significantly different from the benchmark. Cities that received
evacuation were inherently attractive and grew faster than average. Yet according to my
estimations, evacuation itself had little or no effect on their growth (column (1)).
In columns (2) and (3) the sample is split by city size. Large cities (more that 100
thousand inhabitants in 1939) do not gain from evacuation. Medium cities (between 6 and
100 thousand inhabitants) grow faster in 1939-1959, and somewhat more slowly after that
(but the difference is not statistically significant). Finally, in column (4), the specification
includes not just a binary evacuation indicator but also a number of evacuated enterprises
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Dependent variable is an annualized growth rate of a city between two census years, %.
Treatment occupied in WWII 30 km to front 200 km to front
Indep. variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment -0.017 -0.017 -0.070** -0.105** -0.080
(0.018) (0.029) (0.020) (0.046) (0.050)
Treatment ×
1926-1939 -0.230** -0.230** -0.150** -0.226**
(0.051) (0.089) (0.064) (0.067)
1939-1959 -0.163** -0.164** -0.117** -0.082 -0.168**
(0.033) (0.049) (0.032) (0.053) (0.057)
1959-1970 0.111** 0.111** 0.158** 0.147** 0.120**
(0.021) (0.031) (0.023) (0.052) (0.057)
1970-1979 0.047** 0.047* 0.094** 0.092* 0.056
(0.018) (0.027) (0.021) (0.048) (0.053)
1979-1989 0.032* 0.033 0.080** 0.097** 0.058
(0.017) (0.026) (0.019) (0.047) (0.051)
1989-2002 0.053** 0.053* 0.100** 0.150** 0.116**
(0.017) (0.027) (0.021) (0.046) (0.051)
2002-2010 0.015 0.015 0.063** 0.101** -0.077
(0.016) (0.026) (0.018) (0.045) (0.050)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
Years 1987-2010 1987-2010 1987-2010 1987-2010 1987-2010
Number of obs 5636 5636 5636 5636 5636
Errors clustered on city region city city city
Number of clusters 763 87 763 763 763
R-sq overall 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.30 0.31
Robust SE in parentheses, ** - significant at 95% level, * - at 10% level
Table 3: The effect of WWII on city growth, panel estimations.
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Dependent variable is an annualized growth rate of a city between two census years, %.
Treatment enterprises evacuated to city evacuated did not
from city return
Indep. variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 0.137** 0.163 0.014 0.122 0.126* 0.153**
(0.051) (0.114) (0.059) (0.081) (0.068) (0.078)
Treatment ×
1926-1939 0.092 -0.002 0.134 0.143 0.189* 0.063
(0.075) (0.194) (0.084) (0.168) (0.111) (0.106)
1939-1959 0.070 0.121 0.133* -0.129 -0.067 -0.191**
(0.059) (0.129) (0.070) (0.086) (0.081) (0.094)
1959-1970 -0.159** -0.183* -0.059 -0.152* -0.095 -0.125
(0.059) (0.113) (0.063) (0.082) (0.074) (0.087)
1970-1979 -0.152** -0.294** -0.045 -0.159* -0.116 -0.144*
(0.052) (0.143) (0.061) (0.085) (0.070) (0.081)
1979-1989 -0.137** -0.177 -0.028 -0.146* -0.143** -0.151*
(0.052) (0.113) (0.062) (0.082) (0.070) (0.079)
1989-2002 -0.147** -0.177 -0.050 -0.142* -0.139* -0.173**
(0.051) ((0.117) (0.061) (0.083) (0.071) (0.086)
2002-2010 -0.121** -0.177 -0.019 -0.099** -0.088 -0.102
(0.050) (0.113) (0.060) (0.082) (0.067) (0.079)
Evacuated plants -0.001
per 10000 people (0.081)
Evacuated plants















Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Years 1987-2010 1987-2010 1987-2010 1987-2010 1987-2010 1987-2010
Observations all, large, medium, no outliers, all all
no war no war no war occupied occupied
Number of obs 5636 437 2394 3072 2433 2433
Errors clustered on city city city city city city
Number of clusters 763 83 388 417 328 328
R-sq overall 0.35 0.55 0.34 0.42 0.26 0.25
Robust SE in parentheses, ** - significant at 95% level, * - at 10% level.
Table 4: Wartime evacuations and city growth, panel estimations.
21
per capita. Outliers with the most enterprises per capita (10 % of all cities that received
evacuation) were dropped from the sample. The number of establishments does make a
difference in city growth: cities that received more enterprises grew faster in 1939-1959.
Column (5) traces the growth trajectory of the cities that sent enterprises into evacuation.
Again, the pre-war growth of such cities is higher than average, while growth in the 1940s-
1950s is indistinguishable from the average. There are two factors that explain this. First,
the westernmost regions of the USSR were occupied in the first weeks after the beginning of
German invasion, and there was no time for evacuation of industry. Most of the evacuated
enterprises came from regions somewhat farther to the east (Moscow, Tula, Voronezh – to
name a few), and those areas were relatively favored in the pre-war shift of industry in the
1930s. Second, the most important enterprises were the first to evacuate. Cities hosting those
enterprises were growing faster before the war, and were restored as soon as possible after
the war. In contrast, cities where evacuated enterprises did not return after the war were
not among the fast-growing prior to the war, and they lost population thereafter (column
(6)).
Table 5 shows the results for Gulag camps near a city. Gulag cities are different from
the control group, and the difference (as measured by the coefficient before Treatment) is
larger than for the war or evacuation. Gulag cities also grow significantly faster in 1926-
1939. Negative coefficients of treatment-period interactions after 1959 are not large enough
to compensate. In sum, having a Gulag camp nearby increases city growth by more than
evacuation or being spared in the war. Figure 8 plots implied indices of city size for three
treatment groups relative to the control group: occupied cities, cities that received evacuated
enterprises, and cities with a Gulag camp within 50 km.
One of the remaining issues is simultaneity of treatments. Both regional industrial policy
priorities (as proxied by Gulag) and exogenous factors (such as the impact of WWII) work at
the same time and in similar directions: pushing people and economic activity in the USSR
to the east. It is likely that decisions by the Soviet authorities on where to locate industry, or
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Dependent variable is an annualized growth rate of a city between two census years, %.
Treatment Gulag camp in 50 km Gulag camp in 20 km


















Year effects yes yes
Years 1987-2010 1987-2010
Number of obs 5636 5636
Errors clustered on city city
Number of clusters 763 763
R-sq overall 0.36 0.36
Robust SE in parentheses, ** - significant at 95% level, * - at 10% level.
Table 5: Gulag camps and city growth, panel estimations.
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Figure 8: City size index, as implied by separate panel estimations with city effects.
where to invest in infrastructure, drove both Gulag camp allocation and evacuations.These
decisions also are correlated with the distance from the western border, and therefore with
being close to the WWII front lines. There is no guarantee that random effects would be
able to isolate the effects of war from the effect of Gulag, for example. To try to do so,
I estimate a panel model with all three treatments included simultaneously. Table 6 and
Figure 9 present the results.
The conclusions about the effects of the front lines and Gulag camps remain the same.
The trajectory of a city-size index for the evacuation destinations changes though: there is
no more visible structural break in 1959, and no weak mean-reversion after 1959. However,
the changes in the trajectory are small compared to the span of the 95% confidence bound.
Examining the random effects for “randomness” gives some insight into how well the
unobserved city characteristics are controlled for, using the panel structure of the data. In
fact, the random effects generated by the single-panel model (from Table 6) are strongly
correlated with the geographical longitude (43% correlation) and the administrative status
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Treatment Received Gulag
Occupied evacuation in 50 km
Treatment -0.041 0.090 0.129**
(0.051) (0.057) (0.052)
Treatment×
1926-1939 -0.161** -0.005 0.142**
(0.069) (0.080) (0.069)
1939-1959 -0.054 0.049 0.013
(0.059) (0.067) (0.061)
1959-1970 0.141** -0.070 -0.154**
(0.054) (0.059) (0.054)
1970-1979 0.078 -0.095* -0.116
(0.053) (0.058) (0.053)
1979-1989 0.064 -0.079 -0.140**
(0.053) (0.058) (0.052)
1989-2002 0.122** -0.062 -0.169**
(0.053) (0.057) (0.052)




Number of obs 5636
Errors clustered on city
Number of clusters 763
R-sq overall 0.38
Dependent variable is an annualized growth rate of a city between two census years, in %. Robust SE
in parentheses, ** - significant at 95% level, * - at 10% level.
Table 6: Panel model with three treatment variables.
25
Figure 9: City size index, as implied by a single panel model with city effects.
of a city (49% correlation), i.e. they are not actually random. To illustrate, Figure 10 plots
the estimated random effects against geographical longitude.
Figure 10: Estimated city-level random effects and geographical longitude.
Arguably, the positive association between faster growth of a city and its administrative
status does not necessarily present a problem. It might be the result of circular causality: the
best locations become large cities and administrative centers throughout the course of history,
and maybe these cities should have a large unobserved growth component, even in the absence
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of Soviet policy. But a positive correlation with longitude is very nonintuitive. Eastern parts
of Russia are famous for their cold climate, low population density, and remoteness. Large
positive random effects for the majority of the eastern cities are unlikely to be the result
of unobserved attractiveness of their locations; most likely they are the result of a general
eastward bias in the Soviet location policy. That is, panel estimates are unable to distinguish
between locations inherently attractive and locations favored by the Soviet policy.
In the next section, I employ an alternative approach. Instead of controlling for city
heterogeneity with random effects, I explicitly control for the observable characteristics of
a city. Among the control characteristics are geographical location, administrative status,
past population level, and growth rate.
6 Matching Estimations
I analyze long-run trajectories of city growth using Abadie & Imbens (2002) bias-corrected
matching estimator of average treatment effects for all three groups of factors: location
relative to WWII front, industry evacuation, and Gulag. The choice of matching technique
versus regression analysis allows me to remain agnostic about the functional form of the
relationship between control variables and city growth. In principle, this relationship can
be very unorthodox. The most obvious example of this is that the relationship between
geographical variables and city growth does not have to be linear, or even have a simple
functional form. Without a theory to guide the choice of a functional form, and with a large
sample, matching estimators are a logical choice.
For each treated city, one or several matches from the control group are found. Matching
cities must be as similar as possible to the treated city, with the similarity defined over the
set of chosen characteristics. Then, the differences between treatment group and matching
control group are analyzed in order to determine the effect of treatment.
To properly assess the effects of war, evacuation, or Gulag, we must compare cities of
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similar administrative status and geographical location. As panel estimations show, the cities
affected by WWII were different from the control group, even before the war. Therefore, I
must also control for prior city growth and size. In all of the regressions, I exactly match
cities on oblast center status. That is, I compare oblast centers with other oblast centers,
and ordinary cities with other ordinary cities. Oblast centers may be more attractive than
the average city because of their administrative functions.12
Cities also are matched on latitude, longitude, initial population level, and the rate of
growth in the preceding time period. The algorithm looks for the closest matches in this
four-dimensional space of matching characteristics (standardized by the sample variance),
where the metric is given by the Euclidian distance (for details, see Abadie, Drukker, Herr
& Imbens (2001)).
Finally, for each of the treatments, the cities are matched exactly on other treatments.
For example, the growth of cities on both sides of WWII front lines is compared for those
with the same evacuation status (whether enterprises were evacuated from the city, or to the
city) and controlling for having a Gulag camp nearby. In the same way, cities that received
evacuated plants are compared to cities that also were unaffected by WWII fighting, and to
cities with the same Gulag status (presence or absence of a camp in the vicinity).
Table 7 presents the results for the WWII treatments. The effect of occupation is negative
in 1939-1959 (as expected), but by 1970 the recovery is complete. There is no evidence that
being occupied has any effect on city growth 25 years after the end of the war. This is in
line with the results by Davis & Weinstein (2002), who found a similarly complete recovery
from wartime destruction for Japanese cities.
12Another potentially important factor for the city growth are restrictions on residential mobility in the
USSR. I borrow the data on residential restrictions (total and expansion restrictions) from Gang & Stuart
(1999). Total restrictions were meant to prohibit all in-migration except for the cases of family reunion.
Expansion restrictions set targets for new labor from outside of a city that can be attracted by resident
enterprises, and supposedly presented a weaker barrier for city growth. I tried matching cities on mobility
restrictions, but the quality of matching is poor (not too many cities in the sample were restricted, it is
difficult to find a match in the geographical vicinity). Yet the results with this control and without it were
practically the same, which is an indirect confirmation of their result: administrative restrictions did not
have a significant impact on city growth. I do not report these estimates in the paper.
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Dependent variable is LnPopt − LnPopt−1
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment variable 30 km to 200 km to
Occupied front front # of obs
Time period
1939-1959 -0.071** -0.074** -0.135** 624
(0.030) (0.030) (0.034)
1939-1970 -0.012 0.003 -0.063 625
(0.036) (0.037) (0.044)
1939-1979 0.038 0.040 -0.062 625
(0.042) (0.042) (0.051)
1939-1989 0.029 0.023 -0.070 629
(0.047) (0.048) (0.059)
1939-2002 0.074 0.013 -0.069 629
(0.051) (0.057) (0.065)
1939-2010 0.075 0.018 -0.068 627
(0.052) (0.062) (0.069)
% of obs treated 32 43 59
% of exact matches 84 86 85
Matching variables latitude, latitude, latitude,
population 1939, population 1939, population 1939,
growth 1926-1939, growth 1926-1939, growth 1926-1939,
exact matching on oblast center oblast center oblast center
status, status, status,
evacuation (to, from), evacuation (to, from), evacuation(to, from),
Gulag in 50 km. Gulag in 50 km. Gulag in 50 km.
Number of matches - 3, estimators are bias-adjusted for non-exact matching. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity- robust, ** denotes significance at 95% level, * - at 90% level.
Table 7: WWII and city growth, matching estimations.
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As for evacuation status (Table 8), positive effects are observed for cities that received
evacuation, but the effect is not statistically significant beyond 1970. Interestingly, the coef-
ficient for treatment effect does not diminish over time, but its variance grows significantly.
Perhaps to fully explore the heterogeneity in the impact of evacuation, the researchers would
need to collect more detailed archival data on the number of evacuees, size, or specialization
of the enterprises evacuated.
Restricting matching destination-cities to the cities in the same macro-region does not
change the results (column (2)). Cities, where industrial establishments did not return after
the war, grew slower than the average until 1959, but the effect is short-lived and disappears
in 1970 and later (column (5)).
As in the panel estimations, the positive and long-lasting effects for cities that sent plants
into evacuation (column (3)) are due to the same statistical artifact of Soviet regional prior-
ities and selection. When the matching algorithm places too much weight on geographical
proximity, I end up pairing industrial cities in central Russia, where enterprises were evac-
uated from, with cities in the same region where there was no important industry. When I
do not match by longitude, this effect disappears (column (4)).
In contrast, the presence of a Gulag camp has a long-lasting and positive impact on city
growth (table 9, column (1)). The difference between treatment and control group does not
diminish, it actually continues to grow, even up to the present time! City size indices for all
three treatments are plotted on Figure 11.13
In columns (2)-(5), of Table 9, I report the estimates of the treatment effects for dif-
ferent types of Gulag camps. Camps that specialized in agriculture/forestry (most of these
were logging operations, where prisoners worked) or construction had relatively weaker effect
on cities. In “agriculture/forestry” camps, prisoners were used mainly to extract valuable
resource (timber), not to create infrastructure for future development. Among the “con-
13Using “Gulag in 20 km” indicator produces even stronger results. As a robustness check, for the war
and evacuation treatments I also did matching on the prior growth and size of city in 1926 (to have the same
matching set as for Gulag treatment), the results are essentially the same. I do not report these results in
the paper, but they are available upon request.
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Dependent variable is LnPopt − LnPopt−1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment variable enterprises enterprises enterprises enterprises enterprises
evacuated evacuated evacuated evacuated did not # of obs
to to from from return
Time period
1939-1959 0.109** 0.109** 0.378** -0.063* -0.106** 624
(0.036) (0.0367) (0.037) (0.038) (0.047)
1939-1970 0.120* 0.120* 0.262** -0.005 -0.051 625
(0.062) (0.062) (0.041) (0.043) (0.055)
1939-1979 0.114 0.113 0.188** 0.004 -0.056 625
(0.073) (0.073) (0.044) (0.046) (0.060)
1939-1989 0.122 0.120 0.246** -0.013 -0.041 629
(0.082) (0.082) (0.049) (0.050) (0.073)
1939-2002 0.117 0.117 0.173** -0.025 -0.041 629
(0.084) (0.084) (0.051) (0.053) (0.72)
1939-2010 0.101 0.099 0.137** 0.021 -0.038 627
(0.085) (0.085) (0.052) (0.101) (0.068)
% of obs treated 25 25 16 16 8
% of exact matches 99 62 63 63 63
Matching variables latitude, latitude, latitude, latitude, latitude,
longitude, longitude, longitude,
population population population population population
1939, 1939, 1939, 1939, 1939,
growth growth growth growth growth
1926-1939, 1926-1939, 1926-1939, 1926-1939, 1926-1939,
exact matching on oblast oblast oblast oblast oblast
center center center center center
status, status, status, status, status,
war front war front war front war front war front
in 200 km, in 200 km, in 200 km, in 200 km, in 200 km,
Gulag in Gulag in Gulag in Gulag in Gulag in
50 km. 50 km, 50 km. 50 km, 50 km,
Urals, longitude. longitude.
Siberia.
Number of matches - 3, estimators are bias-adjusted for non-exact matching. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity- robust, ** denotes significance at 95% level, * - at 90% level.
Table 8: Wartime enterprise evacuation and city growth, matching estimations.
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Dependent variable is LnPopt − LnPopt−1
Gulag camp in 50 km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment variable resource agriculture and
all camps extraction industry forestry construction # of obs
Time period
1926-1939 0.104** 0.126* 0.223** 0.134** 0.097** 459
(0.046) (0.076) (0.061) (0.057) (0.048)
1939-1959 0.076** 0.218** 0.161** 0.060 0.090** 458
(0.031) (0.053) (0.033) (0.048) (0.031)
1926-1959 0.177** 0.323** 0.381** 0.190** 0.185** 458
(0.061) (0.094) (0.074) (0.085) (0.062)
1926-1970 0.176** 0.279** 0.387** 0.162* 0.200** 458
(0.073) (0.085) (0.088) (0.085) (0.073)
1926-1979 0.198** 0.321** 0.416** 0.195** 0.224** 458
(0.082) (0.093) (0.099) (0.089) (0.084)
1926-1989 0.222** 0.381** 0.422** 0.213** 0.216** 459
(0.088) (0.089) (0.104) (0.092) (0.095)
1926-2002 0.217** 0.355* 0.412** 0.214** 0.215** 459
(0.091) (0.096) (0.109) (0.094) (0.095)
1926-2010 0.226** 0.398** 0.455** 0.273** 0.231** 458
(0.093) (0.095) (0.111) (0.099) (0.098)
% of obs treated 46 18 24 13 34
% of exact matches 97 91 95 93 97
Matching variables latitude, latitude, latitude, latitude, latitude,
longitude longitude longitude longitude longitude
population population population population population
1926, 1926, 1926, 1926, 1926,
growth growth growth growth growth
1897-1926, 1897-1926, 1897-1926, 1897-1926, 1897-1926,
exact matching on oblast oblast oblast oblast oblast
center center center center center
status, status, status, status, status,
evacuation evacuation evacuation evacuation evacuation
(to, from), (to, from), (to, from), (to, from), (to, from),
war front war front war front war front war front
in 30 km in 30 km in 30 km in 30 km in 30 km
Number of matches - 3, estimators are bias-adjusted for non-exact matching. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity- robust, ** denotes significance at 95% level, * - at 90% level.
Table 9: Gulag and city growth, matching estimations.
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struction” camps were those created for the infamous infrastructural projects of the 1930s:
Northern Railroad, White-Sea-Baltic canal. Some of these projects proved a failure and were
abandoned.
On the other hand, camps that specialized in industrial production (either primary in-
dustries or other manufacturing) were creating this coveted “eastern industrial base” of the
Soviet Union. Their impact on city size is twice as strong as that of an average camp.
Figure 11: City size index, as implied by matching estimations.
Table 10 presents estimated treatment effects for the different types of construction in
Gulag. Consistent with Table 9, construction of industrial objects and housing leads to
stronger long-run population increases. Construction of infrastructure shows weaker effects.
7 Conclusion
It is well understood that Gulag made possible many investment projects in the far corners
of the USSR. I show that it also brought significant and long lasting changes to the spatial
economy of the Soviet Union. Its impact worked on both the interregional and the intra-
regional scale.
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Dependent variable is LnPopt − LnPopt−1
Gulag camp in 50 km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment variable industrial industrial
construction construction housing infrastructure
(primary) (manufacturing) construction construction # of obs
Time period
1926-1939 0.206** 0.097* 0.160** 0.105** 459
(0.062) (0.056) (0.067) (0.049)
1939-1959 0.248** 0.141** 0.146** 0.082** 458
(0.065) (0.036) (0.041) (0.031)
1926-1959 0.460** 0.236** 0.302** 0.184** 458
(0.093) (0.072) (0.086) (0.063)
1926-1970 0.399** 0.227* 0.290** 0.212** 458
(0.094) (0.079) (0.094) (0.076)
1926-1979 0.412** 0.255** 0.318** 0.243** 458
(0.109) (0.087) (0.102) (0.087)
1926-1989 0.393** 0.274** 0.333** 0.232** 459
(0.108) (0.092) (0.106) (0.095)
1926-2002 0.389** 0.282** 0.336** 0.226** 459
(0.115) (0.096) (0.109) (0.097)
1926-2010 0.443** 0.337** 0.392** 0.241*** 458
(0.120) (0.100) (0.117) (0.101)
% of obs treated 11 17 21 31
% of exact matches 90 95 94 97
Matching variables latitude, latitude, latitude, latitude,
longitude longitude longitude longitude
population population population population
1926, 1926, 1926, 1926,
growth growth growth growth
1897-1926, 1897-1926, 1897-1926, 1897-1926,
exact matching on oblast center oblast center oblast center oblast center
status, status, status, status,
evacuation evacuation evacuation evacuation
(to, from), (to, from), (to, from), (to, from),
war front war front war front war front
in 30 km in 30 km in 30 km in 30 km
Number of matches - 3, estimators are bias-adjusted for non-exact matching. Standard errors are
heteroskedasticity- robust, ** denotes significance at 95% level, * - at 90% level.
Table 10: Construction by Gulag prisoners and city growth, matching estimations.
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To what extent was Gulag responsible for the reallocation of productive resources toward
the remote regions of the USSR? Millions of people went through the Gulag system, but
compared to the Soviet population, the size of Gulag labor force does not not seem eco-
nomically significant. Even at its maximum, the able-bodied population of Gulag did not
exceed 2% of the Soviet labor force (Khlevnyuk (2004)). A vast majority of Gulag camps
were located close to population centers, where the size of the local labor force significantly
exceeded the size of the camp population. But the presence of a camp is a good indicator
of a local deficit of labor. Gulag was not the only tool of Soviet regional industrial policy,
but its presence is a good signal that the location was chosen by the Soviet authorities for
investment projects. What we observe in the data is probably not the effect of Gulag per se,
but rather the combined effect of Soviet location policy for which Gulag is a good proxy.
Gulag camps were heterogeneous. Some of the camp locations were oriented exclusively
toward resource extraction, were not planned as permanent settlements, and quickly withered
after Stalin’s death. We know examples of abandoned camps in the middle of empty frozen
landscapes. But the camps that were located close to the existing population centers were
used to build basic industrial and public infrastructure, and to supply labor for industrial
facilities, a part of long-term regional planning strategies. Such locations continue to attract
population even after the Gulag system (and prison labor in general) has stopped functioning
as a source of slave labor.
The effect of Gulag is much stronger than the estimated effects of WWII or reallocation
of wartime industry. WWII is an example of exogenous impact, although Soviet authorities
partially relocated productive resources away from the western border in preparation for it.
Evacuation was designed by the Soviet authorities, but it was done under the pressure of
the Nazi invasion and thus should have served the purpose of maximizing Soviet industrial
potential in wartime, i.e. in the short run. In contrast, Gulag was a part of long-run Soviet
location policy, it was deliberately planned, and it served long-term goals. The changes to
the Soviet spatial economy landscape in the 1930s to 1950s proxied by Gulag were perceived
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as (and indeed were) permanent. My findings provide yet another illustration of “successful”
regional policy. It a strong suggestion that to be able to change economic geography in the
long run, the impact of regional policy has to be as significant as Stalin’s industrialization
of the eastern USSR.
The strongest long-term effect found here is for Gulag camps that specialized in industry,
industrial construction, and construction of housing. What are the mechanisms behind this?
Do Stalin-era investments in capital and infrastructure still make the cities attractive, or
are there other history-dependent factors? Is there a difference in local industrial structure
between cities with Gulag camps and cities without them? What about sectoral diversity
and specialization? Is there a difference in human capital? I leave these questions for further
research.
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